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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation:  Armed Seafarers on Board Ships: An Analysis from an 
International Perspective 
 
Degree:   M.Sc. 
 
The dissertation is a study on the possibility of arming seafarers. The 
objective of the study is to examine the methods and instruments that have been 
employed to date and to observe the effectiveness and limitations of these tools in 
the fight against piracy and maritime terrorism. 
The issue of piracy does not seem to be receding as anticipated by the 
global community. In the mind’s eye of the researcher, there seems to be much 
controversy surrounding the very instruments that were adopted to control this 
issue. It is possible that the surrounding controversy could be sparked from lack 
of active actions, will or legal restraints. The dissertation reverts to the times 
when merchant ships carried arms to fend off attackers; an analysis is done on the 
arming of ship’s personnel, as well as, the associated risks and restrictions of such 
practice. 
Consequently the paper looks at the legal aspects of arming a ship’s 
personnel. Since shipping is regulated by international soft laws, and since there 
are no international enforcement for international maritime crimes, legal issues 
fall under the purview of the jurisdiction of the flag states, or the states in which 
the acts have been committed. Therefore, there may be legal implications 
associated with arming of seafarers.  
The author is of the opinion that the seafarers indeed face victimization 
from many angles. Different proponents of maritime security have re-iterated the 
ill fate of these noble artisans. It would seem that the most reliable defence would 
6 
 
be self-defence. However, notwithstanding the hard truth, the author is of the 
opinion that civilian seafarers should not be armed. The writer believes that the 
negative consequences far outweigh the positives that could emanate from this 
practice. 
 
KEYWORDS: Armed Seafarers, Maritime Security, Piracy.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1.   Background 
 
The hijacking of ships and seizure of their crew is one of the most common means 
of gaining control over a vessel. Piracy has had devastating impacts on 
stakeholders in the maritime arena for centuries. Ship owners have experienced a 
myriad of losses resulting from ships being delayed, detained or destroyed, 
expending monies for high ransoms for crew held hostages, rapid increase of 
insurance premiums and in even more unfortunate cases, with the losses of lives. 
Piracy can be dated as far back as the 800-146BC1. It consequently gained global 
attention following the hijacking of the cruise vessel “Achille Lauro” in 1985. In 
response to this incident, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
implemented the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (hereafter SUA), among other resolutions, 
protocols and treaties to prevent unlawful acts which pose threats to the safety of 
ships and security of crew members and passengers alike.2 
For the past four decades industry players coupled with the International 
Maritime Organization in a bid to  find a practical solution to this menace. To date 
many are still dissatisfied with the end results. The pertinent question, would be 
what of the safety of the lives of the men and women who toil the uncharted seas 
to provide the world with the necessities and luxuries it desires?  
It must be appreciated that to reach a satisfactory solution, the root cause must 
first be identified as eradication of a problem is more likely to be successful if the 
root cause is terminated. However, the cause of on sea robbery is a compound 
                                                          
1
Bradford, A. S. (2007). Flying the Black Flag: A Brief History of Piracy. Greenwood Publishing 
Group. 
2
 Pinto, C. A., Rabadi, G., & Talley, W. K. (2008). US port security. Maritime Safety Security and 
Piracy”, Informa: London at Pg. 73 
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issue. The issues for example range from cultural, political, economic and 
technical disparities; these causes may be manifested in different places and in 
varying periods of time. 3   Thus, one approach may not be the answer to 
remedying this problem and all the varying causes must be duly eliminated.  
One blatant cause of this on sea violence is the insufficiencies of the 
international laws governing maritime security. The 1982 United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (hereafter UNCLOS) and SUA Convention 
have perceptible pitfalls which prevent their effectiveness in combating maritime 
terrorism and piracy. In many instances the instruments are unable to expansively 
capture the range of the crime, as well as, the jurisdiction to enforce the 
conventions internationally.4  In light of the inadequacies of the tools being 
employed in the fight against maritime terrorism and piracy, seafarers are left 
vulnerable to attacks of all kinds. The pros and cons of arming a merchant ship 
will be analyzed. 
 
1.2.  Purpose 
The principal purpose of this paper is to examine the different measures 
employed in the fight against piracy including the shortcomings of these methods, 
as well as, the pros and cons of having armed seafarers on board ships. 
Furthermore, the arming of seafarers will be justified under the existing 
international laws on maritime security. 
The qualitative research method is principally used in collating this 
dissertation. The method was selected based on the type of information that will 
be collected for this paper. It should be mentioned that this topic is quite 
contemporary and as such the literature is somewhat limited on the direct arming 
of seafarers, thus the hypothesis of this research was taken from a wide 
                                                          
3
 Logina, A (2009), The International Law Related to Maritime security: An Analysis of its 
Effectiveness in Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. WMU Publication 
4
 ibid 
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standpoint. Additionally, the researcher has interpreted findings and provided 
analyses and recommendations. The qualitative method focuses on gathering 
information that is later analyzed in an interpretative, subjective, impressionistic, 
or even diagnostic manner; hence, this proves to be the more suitable method to 
adopt. Interviews were also carried out further to the qualitative research work. 
 
1.3. Structure 
The preparatory chapter will be followed by a historical overview of piracy in 
which the background and root cause of piracy will be observed succinctly. The 
paper will then briefly delve into specific tenets of SUA and UNCLOS, namely 
the articles related to this topic, for example articles 101-107 and 110 of 
UNCLOS as they directly speak about piracy and article 3 of SUA in relation to 
unlawful acts. This is important as it will give rise to the main idea of the thesis, 
as to why the option of directly arming seafarers could be explored. 
The third chapter will provide a brief synopsis relating to arming of merchant 
vessels in past times. The chapter will seek to identify who is deemed as a 
seafarer under the principles of MLC 2006. This is imperative as it seeks to 
determine whether the armed guards that are currently being used on board are in 
fact considered as seafarers or whether there is a different definition for those 
individuals. Additionally, the rationale behind this initiative of arming seafarers 
will be looked at in context from the practical and legal context. 
The fourth chapter looks at the underlying consequences associated with 
arming the ship’s crew. 
The final chapter will provide a brief summary, concluding remarks, as well 
as, the author’s final view on the topic. 
12 
 
While examples range from different States, in some instances, such as in 
chapter III, cases are taken from the commonwealth countries such as Britain and 
the United States. During the 1700 and 1750, the era of trade provided captivating 
reasons for studying seamen. During this period Britain was one such country that 
was actively involved in arming seafarers. In addition, this period witnessed the 
evolution of the British Shipping industry, as well as, the astonishing expansion of 
the American merchant marine.
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Rediker, M. (1989). Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and 
the Anglo-American maritime world, 1700-1750. Cambridge University Press. Citing Karl Marx, 
“The German Ideology” in Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (Moscow, 1969), vol. I, 
59-60;  Edgar Gold, Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and 
Shipping Law (Lexington, Mass., 1981), 51, 61, 62 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORIAL BACKGROUND AND THE CURRENT STATUS ON 
MARITIME TERROISM AND PIRACY 
The challenges found in maritime security are the underlying reasons for 
the various forms of protection now being introduced. These forms of protection 
range from regional and international cooperations, as well as, the Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) to name a few. Thus to understand the level and 
types of protection needed for seafarers it must be justified what warrants the 
necessary actions. For the past two decades, maritime security has gained 
increasing consideration. Concerns for safety of vessels have always been on the 
IMO’s agenda since the 1980’s but was later crystalized following the 1985 
Achille Lauro incident and later the horrendous events of September 11, 2001 on 
the United States.
6
  The most predominant threat facing ships and their crews 
today is piracy and armed robbery
7
. The threat of maritime terrorism remains 
largely a prospective problem.
8
 However since maritime terrorism still poses a 
potential threat to the safety of crews and commercial shipping, it will be briefly 
examined but here after the focus will be on piracy and armed robbery.  
 
2.1. General Overview on Maritime Terrorism  
 On October 12, 2000, U.S Navy destroyer, USS Cole was attacked while 
refuelling in the harbour of Aden, Yemen. The attack left 17 members of the crew 
                                                          
6
 Mejia, M. (2003), Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and Other 
Acts of Maritime Violence. Journal of International Commercial Law, 2(2), 153-175.    
7
 Schröder, J. U., Mejia Jr, M. Q., Mukherjee, P. K., Manolis, F. M., & Dreeßen, S. (2006). 
Potential consequences of imprecise security assessments. IAMU Journal, 4(2), 31-38. 
8
 ibid 
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dead, 39 suffering from wounds and extensive damage to their vessel.9 
Subsequently, on September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked and took control of 4 
civilian aircrafts. These aircrafts were later used to destroy the World Trade 
Centre, resulting in numerous causalities, fatalities and wreaking mayhem.10  
One may question the link of on-land terrorists attack to that of on-sea 
violence. Furthermore, the similarities and differences as well as, the links of 
piracy and maritime terrorism may be questioned. The horrific events of 
September 11 ignited the search for instances where terrorists could attack and the 
possible objects that could be used as weapons. This led back to the sea and the 
vast business of commercial shipping, as well as, the vulnerability of ships to 
terrorists’ attacks. For example in 2002, the attack on oil tanker M/V Limburgh is 
testimony to the vulnerability of commercial shipping to maritime terrorism11. 
This could be an advanced step from the Achille Lauro incident in 1985.  
Similarly, in 2004, the attack on Superferry 14 in the Philippines also concretized 
the veracity of this threat.  The connection is that maritime terrorism maybe 
disguised as piratical attacks. Murphy states that, there have been speculations 
about the realness of terrorist attacks on the world seaborne trade, specifically in 
areas of raw materials and energy. Murphy wrote that these speculations can be 
aligned with acts of piracy. An example can be drawn from the Dewi Madrim 
incident. In October 2003, terrorists hijacked and took control of the chemical 
tanker by emulating pirate techniques and attempted to navigate the vessel for an 
hour.  Murphy wrote that the attempts to navigate the ship resembled methods 
used by terrorists who hijacked and flew the airplanes used in U.S 2011 attack.12   
Thus it has been evidenced that terrorist operations on land has amplified at sea. In 
                                                          
9
 The Navy Department Library, 2011, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for 
Congress accessed from  http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/usscole_crsreport.htm 
10 Murphy, M. N. (2013). Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to 
International Security. Routledge. accessed from 
http://www.google.se/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4USdYmCA_hQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=maritime+
terroism&ots=bV5wiUdYn1&sig=gArurN5a-
JpiqAVOa2Bwmu2Bv2Y&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=maritime%20terroism&f=false 
11
 ibid 
12
 ibid 
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logical reasoning, crimes in a general sense over time progresses and improve to 
meet criminals’ objectives. Therefore, in reality if terrorists can achieved their 
goals through varied means such as by use of a ship, then realistically this would 
be done. In furtherance, these criminal masterminds may also emulate the patterns 
of pirates to gain access to a ship. This in turn poses additional risks to seafarers.  
 
 
Maritime Terrorism and Piracy 
Piracy Maritime Terrorism 
for personal gains for political gains or insurgency  
Legal and jurisdictional weakness Legal and jurisdictional weakness 
Favourable geography Geographical necessity 
Conflict and disorder  
Under-funded law enforcement  Inadequate security 
 Secure base areas 
Cultural acceptability Maritime tradition 
 Charismatic and effective leadership 
Permissive political environment State support 
Potential for reward Potential for reward 
Figure1. Conditions of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism (adopted: Martin Murphy, 2007) 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The prime differentiating factor between piracy and maritime terrorism is 
that terrorism has a political objective while piracy has a financial motive, that is 
the intention to plunder (animo furandi) or for the sake of gain (lucri causa)13. 
Figure 1 provides a synopsis of the conditions needed for maritime piracy or 
terrorism to thrive. Both have a common ground in potential rewards, as well as, 
                                                          
13
 Mejia, M. (2003), Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and 
Other Acts of Maritime Violence. Journal of International Commercial Law, 2(2), 153-175.   
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jurisdictional and legal weaknesses. Murphy states, that wherever piracy or 
maritime terrorism exist, one are more of these characteristics will be present14. 
These characteristics can be used to compare or contrast the type of on-sea 
violence that is emerging in a specific area. Hence, the correct preventative 
measures such as employing BMPs or use of guards or navy can be implemented 
to counteract the crime, protect seafarers and ship owners’ interests. In 
furtherance, it can be concluded, based on the foregoing that maritime terrorism 
can be confused with piracy and justifies the need to provide active measures of 
combating the crimes. 
 
 
2.2. Background and Historical Overview on Piracy 
Background 
In order to determine an action it is important to decipher the root of the 
problem. It must be respected that if a root cause did not exist there would be no 
need for preventative measures. Hence, the need to implement an active or 
passive measure would be irrelevant. Piracy is the means to an end for some 
people. It has been noted that piracy is built on the shoulders of economic 
depression or rather it has been noted that regions lacking in economic growth 
and sustainability are the areas that are more susceptible to such “on sea 
robbery”.15   The longstanding history of lawlessness, poverty, unregulated and 
unstable economy may be the root cause of maritime crime in the littoral states 
and specifically in Somali waters. Somalia economic stability obliterated after its 
                                                          
14 Murphy, M. N. (2013). Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to 
International Security. Routledge. accessed from 
http://www.google.se/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4USdYmCA_hQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=maritime+
terroism&ots=bV5wiUdYn1&sig=gArurN5a-
JpiqAVOa2Bwmu2Bv2Y&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=maritime%20terroism&f=false 
15
  Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). Somali piracy: A Nasty Problem, A Web of 
Responses. Current History, 108(718), 227-231., accessed on 8 April 2013     from    
http://search.proquest.com/docview/200722244/13D5678A36B6BE8700E/11?accountid=43722 
17 
 
government collapsed in the early 1990s.
16
  Employment became scarce and other 
developed nations pillaged off their livelihood. To survive, natives have turned to 
the sea to commit unlawful acts. It is believed that the total eradication of piracy 
has to be a consolidated effort at the national, regional and international levels, 
taking into consideration the root cause of the problem. 
 
Historical Overview 
Scull painted black flags, wooden legs, patched eyes, hooked arms, long 
beards and swords, were all mental images associated with ancient day pirates. In 
the modern world, swords have been replaced with AK-47 automatic assault rifles 
as the face of piracy changed. Piracy has been the “bête noire” of shipping since 
the beginning of seabourne trade. Over the past three decades, piracy has 
modelled many shapes and forms; different locations were affected in different 
eras. For example there were pirate attacks against the boat people of Vietnam in 
the 1970s, subsequently in the 1980s and 1990s there were the South China Sea 
piratical attacks and finally in current times, Somalia and West Africa pirate 
attacks.
 17
 Piratical activities can be grouped in the following eras.
18
 
 The Greeks (800-146 BC) 
 The Romans (753 BC - AD 476) 
 The Vikings (AD 793-1066) 
 The Buccaneers (1605 -1701) 
                                                          
16 Kontorovich, E. (2010). Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and 
Terrorists, A. Cal. L. Rev., 98, 243. Accessed on 18 August, 2013, from: 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol98/iss1/6 
17
 Max Q Mejia Jr, Maritime Piracy: A Multi-dimensional Issue, 2012. Pg. 8 
18
 Bradford, A. S. (2007). Flying the black flag: A brief history of Piracy. Greenwood Publishing 
Group. 
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 The Barbary Pirates (1320-1785) 
 The Tanka (Chinese) pirates (1709-1820) 
 America and the Barbary Pirates (1785-1815) 
A story of early piratical activity was the apprehension of young Julius 
Caesar. He was captured by Cilician pirates while voyaging across the Aegean 
Sea. The pirates required 20 talents for his release but the young Caesar felt 
belittled and demanded that the value of his release be increased to 50 talents.
19
  
The act of piracy was not restricted to western countries.  In fact, records 
can be found in support that the phenomenon existed in China as far back as the 
Han Dynasty (106 BC - AD 220) and is believed to have existed prior to this time.  
This phenomenon stretched to the 16
th
 century and was driven by the 
revolutionary milieus of the Ming and Qing empires. On the contrary, prior to the 
colonial period it would seem as though piracy in West Africa never existed. 
Perhaps at this time the state did not possess such disposition or maybe this time 
in West African history was not properly documented. Early pirate ventures were 
predominantly focused on affluence, but at the same time it had the intentions of 
territorial acquisition as well.
 20
. 
Two forms of piracy developed in the age of discovery with the race to 
colonize the world. One form of piracy was solely for the purpose of plundering 
while the other was for political gain. During the period of plundering, pirates 
                                                          
19 Bradford, A. S. (2007). Flying the black flag: A brief history of Piracy. Greenwood Publishing 
Group  pg 43 
20
 Antony, R. (2005). Piracy in Early Modern China. IIAS Newsletter, 36(7). accessed from 
http://www.iias.nl/nl/36/IIAS_NL36_07.pdf/  Elleman, B. A., Forbes, A., & Rosenberg, D. 
(2010). Piracy and maritime crime: Historical and Modern  Case Studies. NAVAL WAR COLL 
NEWPORT RI. Pg. 37 accessed from http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Piracy-and-Maritime-
Crime-NWC-2010.pdf 
19 
 
rested in remote islands before and after conducting their raids. Libertalia was one 
such pirate state located in Madagascar for more than twenty years
21
.  The 
infamous Blackbeard (Edward Teach) was party to this form of piracy. He 
dominated the Caribbean waters in the mid-1700s.  The other form of piracy was 
sanctioned by States. This was the period when Europeans fought against each 
other to eliminate their competition and dominate a specific area.  These pirates 
were known as “corsairs” (French) and “privateers” (English).22  The difference 
between the forms of piracy is that one was for personal gain while the privateers 
or corsairs were pirates appointed by the State to practice piratical acts.  Sir 
Francis Drake and Sir Henry Morgan were two such pirates that were later 
knighted and appointed Governor of Jamaica in 1674 by King Charles II
23
.   
 
Weapons Used in Early Day Piracy versus Weapons Being Used Today 
During the days of the sails, pirates utilized bladed paraphernalia such as 
cutlasses, knives, daggers and malinspikes
24
/
25
 as weapons against their enemies. 
These weapons were initially used as tools for sailing, for example, sharp knives 
were used to cut ropes while malinspikes were used to separate knotted ropes. 
Towards the end of the 18
th
 century axes and tomahawks were introduced in 
combats. The flintlock pistols were common during the Golden age of piracy 
                                                          
21
 Birnie, P. W. (1987). Piracy: past, present and future. Marine policy, 11(3), 163-183. accessed 
from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308597X87900546 
22
 Risso, P. (2001). Cross-cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf Region During a long Eighteenth Century. Journal of World 
History, 12(2), 293-319. 
23
 Birnie, P. W. (1987). Piracy: past, present and future. Marine policy, 11(3), 163-183. accessed 
from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0308597X87900546 
24
 Malinspikes, where similar to an ice pick 
25
 Hamilton, J. (2010). Pirate Ships and Weapons. ABDO. 
20 
 
(1660-1740)
26
. Compared to the golden age, modern day pirates are armed with 
AK-47, semi-automatic rifles and grenade rocket launchers.
27
  
Concluding Remarks 
From the above text, it can be concluded that there have been changes 
globally that have translated into modern day piracy. West Africa, a once docile 
country is now one of the leading countries in this phenomenon. An underlying 
reason for the piratical activities in this region today is due to the political and 
economical instability of these littoral States. Kontorovich citing Jamal Osama 
wrote “We are hungry. There is no Government. No economy. It is a good way to 
earn money”28. It is important to note that the agenda of early days’ pirates is 
different from modern day pirates, thus the will fuelling piratical acts is 
correspondingly different. In the Anglo–American period (early 1700s), pirates 
stemming from American and English crews for example were once sailors who 
later became mutineers.
29
 Many of these men were sea and land military 
strategists, some were privateers, knighted and sanctioned by their States to seize 
countries in their names, but over time these servants became pirates as in the 
case of William Kidd.
30
  The fundamental difference between pirates of 1700 
milieu and pirates of the 21
st
 century is that early days’ pirates mostly hailed from 
powerful and wealthy nations. In that line, the choice to become a pirate may not 
have emerged from desperation or on the basis of survival. In regions such as 
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Somalia, criminal syndicates were formed with the purpose to create opportunities 
in order to survive; hunger, lack of political and economic support is the driving 
power behind their actions.  
In summary, the evolution of pirates and weaponries over time call for 
more stringent measures in suppressing the crime. Modern day pirates are armed 
with a different objective, as well as, equally powerful artilleries.  Today, piracy, 
“hostes humani generis” (the enemy of mankind) is acknowledged as a ferocious 
crime that has the potential to disturb local communities, economies and the 
world trade. The evolution of piracy has elicited concerns surpassing that required 
in earlier times.   
 
2.3. Current State of Piracy 
In the 20
th
 century, the known hotspots for piratical activities were South East 
Asia (the Malacca Straits and South China Seas). In recent times the hottest piracy 
spot in Africa was the Gulf of Guinea, specifically the waters off the Niger Delta 
in Nigeria but since of late, the Horn of Africa has become the fore runner.  
(figure 2 shows a high concentration of attempted attacks and hijackings in the 
traditional pirate infested areas; figure 3 is illustrating international trends from 
1990 to 2010 of the affected areas;
31
 while figure 4 is showing the extended pirate 
infested areas in the Horn of Africa from 2005-2011). 
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Figure 2. Map of Traditional Pirate Infested Areas. 32 
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Figure3. Pirate Incidents from 1990-2010 (Adopted from Geopolity, 2011) 
33
 
 
The highly traversed Malacca Straits, South China Sea and Somali waters 
were known for their high volume of pirate attacks annually,34  however, in 2011, 
there were noticeable reductions in the frequency of these attacks especially in the 
Somali regions. Pirate attacks fell from 163 in the first six months in 2011, to 69 
in 2012; while vessel hijackings fell from 21 to 13.35  Whereas Somali waters have 
seen a reduction in piratical activities, there has been a vast upsurge in places such 
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as the Gulf of Guinea, where 32 incidents were reported in 2012 in comparison to 
25 reported cases in 2011.36  (see figure 3 and 4). 
 
Figure 4. A Map Illustrating Pirate Infested Areas in the Horn of Africa.37 
 
 
The IMB declared the current number of attacks on ships in 2012 as 297 in 
comparison with 439 in 2011. The organization reported that though there was a 
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significant reduction in the numbers for the Somali region, there were obvious 
increases in the attacks in the East and West Africa regions.38 The IMB 
documented that on the worldwide scale, 174 ships were boarded in 2012, 28 were 
commandeered while 28 were fired upon.39  
An important question would be how accurate are the claims that piracy has 
indeed taken a plunge? 40  The accuracy of information has a ripple effect.  If it is 
that piracy is indeed receding, then the need for aggressive response such as 
arming of the crew whether directly or through the use of naval support or private 
armed security guards would become unnecessary and would thereby justify the 
use of the BMPs instead. Another element to observe is that while the crime has 
seemed to dissipate in one area, it has manifested in another; thus the plague is 
still embedded within the maritime arena and calls for active measures to eradicate 
it.  As mentioned earlier, the root cause must be eliminated in order to 
successfully rid the international community of the plague; is it that the economic 
situation in Somalia has now been resolved? People must be economically viable, 
given that the situation in these trouble areas remain the same, could it be possible 
that the issue of piracy is not reduced but in a dormant period? Could it be that the 
international community is also aware of this and could this be the rationale for 
employing guidelines for the use of force and the use of armed security guards? 
Support for this assertion can be found in Geopolity’s May 2011 report: 
 “the increase in piracy is likely to continue: the comparative economic benefits have 
guaranteed a virtually unlimited supply of willing labour. Somali piracy is unlikely to be 
eliminated solely through an increased foreign naval presence; only a restoration of 
domestic stability and effective local governance can provide viable alternatives in the 
long term. Since piracy remains by far the most lucrative option available to many 
                                                          
38
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Somalis—offering minimum earnings 67 times higher than the national average, 
according to the most conservative estimates—it is unlikely to go away any time soon. 
While the multilateral military presence has reduced the success rate of such hijackings, 
they do not provide a sufficient disincentive to potential pirates”41 
Indicator Amount in USD 
Low/high pirate income (2010): Using 1,500 
pirates 
US$33,000 –US $79,000 per year 
Potential lifetime earnings (2010): Using 1,500 
pirates  
US$168,000 – US$394,000 
Next best alternative US$500 per year 
Pirate incomes compared to average income 67 – 157 times higher 
Number of pirates could double by 2016 
Total cost of piracy 2010 US$4.9 – 8.3 billion 
Projected increase by 2014 US$13 – 15 billion 
Major stakeholders 
Financiers, sponsors, officials, pirates, 
maritime insurers, security companies, 
navies, merchant marine. 
Figure 5. Economic Indicators of Somali Piracy (Adopted from Geopolity)42 
Concluding Remarks 
Based on the documented information presented in figure 5, it would seem 
as though the incentives to continue this on sea violence outweighs the 
consequences. For example an annual earning for a native engaged in piratical 
activity ranges from US$ 33,000 – US$ 79, 000, this translates to 67 to 157 times 
more than the next best financial alternative would generate. If it is that piracy is 
not anticipated to fully recede soon, or if it is anticipated that the incentives will 
attract perspective pirates then this is another justification for arming seafarers. 
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2.4. The Cost of Piracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The Human Costs of Piracy. (Adopted from Oceans Beyond Piracy)43 
 
Human Cost of Piracy 
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 http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_2011_2_pgr.pdf 
3,863 seafarers were fired upon by armed pirates. Numerous 
ships and crews have suffered attacks, some multiple times. 
Pirates are using increasing violence and firepower, often 
directed at the bridge and living quarters. 
968 seafarers came into close contact with armed pirates that  
gained access to their vessels after the initial assault. 
413 (44%) of these seafarers were rescued from citadels by 
naval forces, often after waiting for hours or days in terror and 
uncertainty about their fate as pirates actively fought to break 
into the citadel 
555 seafarers were attacked and taken hostage in 2011. 
Those seafarers not rescued are kidnapped and held for 
months without proper nutrition, access to medical care, or 
communication with their families. They all suffered abuse 
by pirates. 
31% 
43% 
14% 
12% 
+ 
645 Hostages 
Captured in 2010 
Victims of Somali Pirates in 2011 
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 Of all the associated costs of piracy, the greatest of them all is the human 
costs.   Reports revealed that in the year 2010, 4185 seafarers were attacked by 
pirates with firearms while in 2011, 3862 seafarers were attacked. In 2011, 968 
vessels were boarded by pirates compared to 1432 vessels boarded in the previous 
year. Seafarers taken hostages totalled 555 in 2011 while in 2010, 1090 seafarers 
were taken hostage (see figure 6 and 7). Furthermore it was reported that 1206 
seafarers taken hostage were mistreated and in some instances extremely 
abused.
44
  During 2011, 35 seafarers died after being held hostages died while 8 
were killed by pirates after being taken captive, a further 8 died from disease and 
malnourishment  while being held captive; and 19 died while being used as 
human shields during hostage rescue efforts.
45
 
Nature 2010  2011 
Seafarers attacked by 
pirates with firearm 
4185 3862 
Seafarers on vessel 
boarded by pirates 
1432 968 
Seafarers taken hostage 1090 555 
Figure 7. Seafarers Attacked in 2010 and 2011. (Adopted from Oceans Beyond Piracy)
46
 
It is worthy to note that even in the absence of physical suffering or loss of 
lives, the trauma endured by a seafarer who has fallen victim to the grips of piracy 
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is immeasurable. The trauma is not contained to the seafarer but extends also to 
his or her family. 
 
Total Estimated Cost of Piracy 
The total estimated costs for piracy in 2012 totalled $5-6 billion dollars for 
industry players and $1.09 billion dollars for government. The cost to provide 
armed security guard services amounted to 1.5 billion versus military operations 
of $1.09 (see figures 8 and 9 for a breakdown of the costs) 
 The military costs of $1.09 billion included, the fee for scouting aircrafts 
and unmanned vehicles, vessel protection detachment, naval operations, 
administrative naval budget charge, as well as, costs for Shared Awareness and 
De-confliction (SHADE) meetings. 
In 2013, the Danish Government reported the safe release of the crew of 
M/V Leopard but refused to reveal the pay-out amount in fear that it would 
become a bench-mark figure in possible future hostage situations.
47
 In 2012, 
$31.75 million dollars were expended in ransom pay-outs to Somali pirates. 
Other costs to industry players included the cost for security equipment, 
totalling $1.65-$2.06 billion; re-routing costs amounting to $290.5 million; 
increase speed cost totalling $1.53 billion; prosecution and imprisonment fee 
equalling $14.89 million, armed security guards totalling 1.5 billion, while 
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insurance and counter piracy organization costs amounted to $634.9 million and 
$24.08 million respectively.
48
 
Industry Players Government 
$5-6 Billion Yearly $1.09 Billion Yearly for military operations 
$13.6 -16.4 Mil per day $2.9 Mil per day 
Figure 8. Comparative Cost of Piracy between Government and Industry Players49 
 
50
Figure 9. Costs of Piracy (Adopted from Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012) 
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Concluding Remarks 
 The inhumane treatment of seafarers, coupled with the rising costs of 
piracy, justifies yet another reason why directly arming seafarers could possibly 
prevent being captured in the first instance much more being subjected to such 
hostilities and abuse while being held captives.  
 
2.5 Instruments Used In the Suppression of Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts 
 The IMO in addition to its 1988 SUA Convention and 1982 UNCLOS, in 
2004, finalized the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), with sixteen (16) countries 
being party to the agreement. Also in July 2004, the IMO amended the 1974 
Convention on the Safety of Lives at Sea (SOLAS) to supplement as the 
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code. Under SOLAS, piracy is 
threated as acts of terror with minor differences.
51
 January 2009, saw the 
regulatory body initiating high-level meetings to discuss the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct. The instrument spoke to the suppression of armed robbery against ships 
in the West Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Similarly to RECAAP, the 
instrument seeks to establish regional cooperation between various countries by 
sharing information on piratical activities.
52
  Other cooperations include the 
United States Coordinated Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), NATO’s 
Operation Ocean Shield and the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR 
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Operation Atalanta which are the three foremost multinational task forces 
operating for the suppression of piracy.
53
 
This section will briefly observed the two main instruments UNCLOS and 
SUA for the reason that all other legal framework used in combating or 
suppressing piracy and armed robbery has UNCLOS at its core. According the 
Kraska and Wilson, the legal framework in the fight against maritime piracy is 
formed amidst the organized responses of maritime law with UNCLOS at its 
centre.
54
 Furthermore since the focus of this dissertation is not on the anti-piratical 
tools, the main provisions directly giving rise to this topic will be examined. 
 
1982 UNCLOS 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) opened 
for signature on the 10
th
 of December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica and entered 
into force in 1994. The Convention sought to codify rules in a bid to subdue acts 
of piracy. 
55
 To date over 166 countries have ratified56 UNCLOS. Thus the efforts 
to create uniformed rules globally in the suppression of piracy had a wide level of 
acceptance. The principal limitation with UNCLOS however, is the ancient 
definition of the term piracy. As mentioned before, piracy has long changed its 
face. The evolution of piracy, the modus operandi of pirates and the nature of the 
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crime has become sophisticated. As such the instrument’s archaic definition of 
piracy does not capture the contemporary image of the crime. Piracy as defined 
under article 101 is: 
a) “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship 
or private aircraft, and directed 
a. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons 
or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
b. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in  a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state; 
b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of the facts making it  a pirate ship or aircraft; 
c) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b)”57 
  The geographical location of piracy has relocated from the high seas to 
coastal areas. With this current repositioning, the definition of piracy under 
UNCLOS has lost its ability to capture the modern nature of the crime, since the 
act must be committed on the high seas to be recognized under international law 
as piracy.
58
 For example, pirate attacks have taken place as close as 11.55 nautical 
miles away from shore however, under the current definition this would not be 
considered as piracy.
59
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Another notable detractor is that attempted attacks are not classified as acts 
of piracy. Acts of piracy under article 101 of UNCLOS consists of “any illegal 
acts of violence, detention or depredation…”60 Depredation according to the 
Oxford online dictionary means “an act of attacking or plundering”. The provision 
was not specific in including attempted attacks. Thus under article 101 of 
UNCLOS, if attackers attempted to board a vessel but were deterred by actions of 
the crew, then the definition of piracy under article 101 of UNCLOS does not 
specifically include this act of attempt.
61
  
Further limitation with the definition of piracy is the “two ship rule”. 
UNCLOS refers to piracy as an act committed by the crew or passengers of a 
private ship against another ship, or against persons or property on board such 
ship. Experts such as Murphy and Menefee have argued that the lines of this 
article are unclear. Menefee puts forward an argument counteracting this 
limitation; one argument resulted from the interpretation of UNCLOS 101 (a).
62
 
Menefee contends that both parts of article 101(a) of UNCLOS are conscripted 
differently
63
. Menefee states that the second part of the article 101 (a) of 
UNCLOS does not speak of the “two-ship rule” while the first part of article 101 
(a) of UNCLOS
64
 stated that “piracy is an act directed against a ship, persons or 
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property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state”65  Logina wrote “under 
such construction it turns out that in places outside the jurisdiction of any state 
takeover of a ship from within is piracy, but on the high seas it is not piracy”66 In 
furtherance, Logina went on to explain that the difference in approach to the high 
seas and the places outside the jurisdiction of any state seems not to have any 
foundation.  Logina concluded that an assumption could be drawn that the intent 
of the drafters was to “apply the “two ship rule” for both territories, or not apply 
the “two ship rule” for both territories”. Furthermore, Logina stated that either this 
was the intention of the drafters or perhaps the scribers had made an error in 
constructing these lines of article 101 (a). 
Further to this interpretation of the “two ship rule” it is presumed that if 
the ship was accessed by stowaways who subsequently gained control over the 
vessel, then this would not be considered as piracy.
67
  An example of this nature is 
the case of Achille Lauro. On October 10, 1985, four Palestines boarded a ship as 
normal passengers. Upon being discovered that they were transporting heavy 
armament they took control of the ship as she was Sailing form Alexandria to Port 
Said. The Palestines killed American passenger Leon Klinghoffer and threw his 
body over board after their requests to dock at Tartus was refused.
68
 The Achille 
Lauro incident did not include two ships, hence under the provision this act would 
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have not been considered as piracy. This incident however gave rise to the SUA 
Convention. 
Coming back to present day, pirates often times use skiffs to go alongside 
ships while attempting to board the vessel. Hypothetically, if these pirates board 
this ship and took control of the vessel and crew, would this not be considered as 
acts of piracy? Or would the skiff be considered as a ship, thereby conforming to 
the “two ship rule.” 
 
1988 SUA Convention 
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) was entered into force on the 
1
st
 of March 1992
69
. The principal purpose of the SUA Convention was to ensure 
that suitable actions were taken against persons who committed unlawful acts 
against ships. Since this dissertation is an analysis on arming of seafarers, two 
prominent  issues is the fact that the SUA Convention did not speak of armed 
robbery or piracy, nor did it defined or justified what were deemed unlawful acts 
or spoke of unlawful acts in the text. Lastly, the SUA Convention does not deem 
the murdering of persons on board as an impediment to the safe navigation of the 
ship.  
Logina noted that the SUA Convention did not speak of armed robbery or 
piracy; rather it addressed offences as unlawful acts.
70
  However, the wording 
used in the document did not speak of unlawful acts but rather of offences as so 
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listed under article 3 of the Convention.  Therefore, the deduced conclusion is that 
the unlawful acts to which the preamble and title spoke of, are the offences listed 
in article 3 of SUA.
71
  Since the SUA Convention did not define the term 
“unlawful act”, but instead provided a disclosed list (tenets of article 3) which 
falls under this notion, the phrase is subjected to interpretation. For example what 
may be considered as lawful in one State, may be unlawful in another. Therefore 
this would create a loophole and may prove hard to indict persons on these 
grounds of committing an “unlawful act”. 
Kraska and Pedrozo wrote that since the SUA Convention was intended to 
subdue acts against the safety of maritime navigation, under article 3 paragraph 1 
(g), it would suggest that “injuring or killing of a passenger on a seized vessel that 
did not endanger the ship’s navigation should not be included in the treaty, 
whereas injury or killing that does endanger the ship’s navigation is already 
covered under paragraph 1(b) (an act of violence likely to endanger the ship’s 
navigation).”72 Kraska et al cited Halberstam, stating that the intentional injury or 
homicide of a person on board the ship was a different and distinctive offence, not 
simply an aggravating situation of seizing the ship.
73
  In furtherance, Kraska and 
Pedrozo explained that failure to include “injury or murder as a separate criminal 
offence”, as opposed to an aggravating circumstance of another crime, might 
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exclude using it as the basis for extradition under the Convention, weakening the 
entire structure of “extradite and prosecute”.74  
In concluding Kraska et al explained that while murdering a passenger 
does not necessarily jeopardise the safety of the ship, the main reason for 
defending the vessel is to secure the persons on board.
75
  
 The justification for briefly examining these two Conventions, SUA and 
UNCLOS, is that these Treaties were drafted to suppress unlawful and violent 
acts at sea. If the Conventions did not have the noticeable pitfalls, then perhaps 
they would have successfully achieved their mandate. However, since the 
Conventions are lacking in pertinent areas needed to ensure the protection of 
seafarers and passengers alike then is also gives rise to the arming of seafarers. 
It should be noted that both SUA and UNCLOS lack consistency for trial 
and penalty processes. Thus the process for trial and penalty is determined by 
municipal laws which differ across countries. In order to ensure that offenders 
are punished, there needs to be standardization in handling of criminals as this 
would allow states to be confident with their resources for apprehending pirates 
and ensuring that efforts are not futile.
76
 In countless instances pirates are 
captured, but released after a few days. The reason being that international laws 
are soft laws and is not enforceable; the only enforcement comes when these laws 
are included in the national laws of States. For example, Canada is one such State 
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that has recognized the loopholes with the SUA Convention. To fill the gaps, the 
government of Canada has enshrined criteria in their municipal laws.
77
 
 
2.6. Best Management Practices & its Effectiveness 
In May 2011, the Maritime Safety Committee, at its eighty-ninth session 
adopted the resolution MSC.324 (89) on the Implementation of Best Management 
Practice Guidance.
78
 The Best Management Practices (BMPs) is a list of 
guidelines to assist in evading, daunting or suspending pirate attacks in high risk 
areas
79
, for example in the Arabian Gulf. Furthermore, the BMPs include 
measures such as evasive manoeuvring to ensure ship safety. Other 
recommendations given to deter pirates ranged from physical barriers such as 
razor wires, electrified barriers, water spray and foam monitors, security alarm 
systems, use of closed circuit televisions, safe muster points and safe lock 
citadels.80 
The best management practices were established to work in conjunction 
with the assistance of naval support. The idea being that hijacked ships could rely 
on the naval vessels to rescue and secure the crew against being held as hostages.81  
In some instances, the best management practice approach achieved its mandate as 
in the case of MV Magellan Star.  On 8th of September, 2010, the MV Magellan 
Star, a German Container Ship, flagged by Antigua and Barbuda, was sailing in 
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the Gulf of Aden. It is important to note that the ship was being escorted by 
United States Naval Forces; however, they became separated during the course of 
voyage; during this time, the vessel was hijacked by pirates. Luckily, all members 
of the crew were able to secure themselves in the safe haven until naval support 
came, disarmed the pirates and safely handed back the ship to its Captain.82 
 Some important questions to answer are: 
 Why is the best management practices used? 
 Can weapons be deterred by a paper bound document? 
 Who is in charge of protecting the vessel,  whether flag state or ship owner 
In the author’s opinion, the BMPs serve as an interim solution, since the 
eradication of on–sea violence needs to be corrected from a political, technical and 
economic standpoint. In a meeting with Martin Conroy,83 he stated that the BMPs 
are low cost methods that allow companies to appear to meet their responsibilities 
without expending monies. Conroy stated that for the BMPs to be effective there 
has to be a continuum that is determining when the passive methods will work and 
knowing when to apply lethal force. Conroy explained using an example that the 
BMPs by itself would not be sufficient security measures for a ship going through 
Kuwait.  A follow-up question would be whether the BMPs are a communication 
campaign. Since ships are still being attacked and seafarers taken hostage, this 
provides an indirect answer that a paper bound document (BMPs) cannot deter the 
armed attacks of pirates. Support for is in the case of MT Samho Jewelry. 
“MT Samho Jewelry, a 19,609-ton product tanker carrying chemicals, was 
Maltese flagged, Norwegian owned, and operated by South Korea's Samho 
Shipping. It had a crew of 21, including Burmese, Indonesians, and Koreans. On 
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the morning of 15 January 2011, the ship was situated in the Arabian Sea, en 
route from the United Arab Emirates to Sri Lanka when the ship was seized by 
Somali pirates. The crew activated the ship’s security alert system and withdrew 
to the citadel but within three hours the pirates had destroyed the hatch and had 
taken the crew hostage. Some of the hostages were beaten, and one reported that 
he lost several teeth.”84 
As mentioned before, the BMPs were intended to work along with the 
support of the naval forces, since a coalition of naval support may not always be 
reliable. The question of proximity comes into play. How can the crew be assured 
that help will be rendered in times of distress? The issues of jurisdiction will also 
be tested. Even though numerous warships have been deployed in these high risk 
areas, they may choose to operate independently due to sovereignty issues and as 
such some naval forces are organized to protect their countries’ shipping interests. 
States such as Netherlands, Russia, India and Japan have done this in the past.85 
Support for this assertion is given citing Martin86, he stated that military protection 
is not reliable as the State does not work for ship owners. Martin continued saying 
“if the military has communicated that they will meet a vessel at the Suez Canal 
and for unforeseen reasons the ship has been delayed, then the navy may not wait 
on the ship” seen as the military work on their own time and schedule and works 
under the jurisdiction of their sovereign states.   
In this same vein lies another challenge for the effectiveness of BMPs, 
which is the scarcity of warships. Approximately 50,000 vessels traverse the 
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Malacca Straits yearly carrying an estimated one third of the world’s trade,87 while 
20,000-30,000 ships ply through the Gulf of Aden annually; it becomes almost 
impossible to provide the corresponding number of warships needed to escort 
these vessels through these high-risked areas.88  
Concluding Remarks 
It would seem as though the total effectiveness of the BMPs is hampered 
by the inability to provide equally matching number of warships in the high risk 
areas. As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, the cost to maintained naval 
support runs the government an annual budget of approximately 2 billion United 
States dollars. In addition it costs the industry over 5 to 6 billion annually to 
maintain security presence for their ships. Furthermore some nations have a 
stronger military presence in the high risk areas but may prefer to only protect 
ships under their flag.  The cost of military presence on the seas is high as seen in 
chapter 2.4, what if the government should decide to pass this cost on to industry 
players, coupled with their existing budget? The cost of piracy may become 
extravagantly high for ship owners and operators who may shy away from 
providing vessel protection. If this should happen, the question of who will pay or 
ensure that seafarers are protected is very important. Article 94 of UNCLOS 
reads89.  
“every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are 
necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: 
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
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(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, 
taking into account the applicable international instruments; 
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the 
prevention of collisions”90 
On this basis it can be assumed that flag states is responsibility for 
ensuring that ships that fly their flags are protected. Furthermore according to 
article III of the MLC 2006, “every seafarer has a right to a safe and secure 
workplace that complies with safety standards”91 In addition, Regulation 5 of the 
MLC 2006 states that it is each Member’s  responsibility to enforce and 
implement the articles and rights set forth in the text of the document. Therefore 
seen as the seafarer is entitled to a safe and secure working environment, and seen 
as the flag state is deemed responsible for ensuring all rights are reinforced, it can 
be assumed that it is the flag state’s duty to ensure that ship-owners provide a safe 
and secure working environment. Since the term “safe and secure” was used in a 
general sense in both the MLC 2006 and UNCLOS, it can be interpreted that this 
means safety and security in every general sense. However, under the tenets of 
article 94 of UNCLOS, the flag state still has a responsibility to also provide 
protection. 
This comes back to the question of “ability to protect” and the use of 
“Flags of Convenience”. If it is that flag states are expected to provide safety and 
security what of the small flag states such as Antigua and Barbuda, Panama, to 
name a few that lack the capability to protect the ships they have flagged? This 
would go back to point zero and the seafarers would be left again without added 
protected and once more would justify the possibility to arm seafarers. 
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2.7. Combating Piracy by Having Guns On board Ships 
There are no explicit laws forbidding the arming of merchant vessels, 
whether arming by means of contracted armed security personnel, the direct 
arming of seafarers, or security through the use of military forces. In 2009, the 
IMO and the international arena strongly opposed this option supposedly due to 
the plethora of legal and other underlying liabilities. Subsequently, BIMCO 
moved to create GUARDCON. GUARDCON supports a more active response to 
piracy by providing contract security services to ship owners. This strategy, 
however, gives overall responsibility to the Master. This active approach was not 
readily embraced as it refutes article 34.1 under SOLAS, which states that the 
Master92 should not be restricted to resolve incidents which relate to safety of life 
and the protection of the environment. 93 Though the IMO initially expressed that 
they did not endorse seafarers carrying firearms nor did they encouraged the use of 
privately armed security personnel; the IMO however, follows the trend of the industry, 
thus in94 in May, 2011, at its eighty-ninth Maritime Safety Committee Session, the 
Committee approved an interim guidance to ship owners, ship operators and 
shipmasters on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board 
ships in the High Risk Area95.    
United Kingdom’s Prime Minister, David Cameron declared and openly 
demonstrated Britain’s support for the use of armed security personnel. He stated 
that “pirates are succeeding at holding the world at ransom”. In this vein he 
challenged the maritime fraternity to respond with much vigour. It would seem 
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that many countries, contrary to what they professed, welcomed this new change 
as they began to authorize their merchant vessels to carry weapons or hire armed 
guards under the umbrella of self-defence. Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America are some countries that took the lead in this 
initiative, while others such as Germany, Malta, Cyprus and India are undergoing 
policy changes in this regard.96  
In the researcher’s point of view these actions would have seemed to 
recognize the limitations of the instruments used in supressing piracy and armed 
robbery. In furtherance, it seemingly demonstrates the acknowledgment that the 
BMPs are not forceful enough to repel these unlawful acts. Or could it be that the 
call for more “vigour” from David Cameron and other influential countries 
sparked this response? Nordquist; Wolfrum; Moore and Long wrote: 
“It should be common place that security at sea is to say the least 
challenged by numerous threats. If not countered appropriately, these 
threats will inevitably limit our economic sustainability, as well as our 
capabilities to continue using the world’s oceans for security operations. 
Especially in Europe, some political leaders neither recognize the 
importance of the sea, nor are they willing to take decisions necessary for 
an effective and efficient preservation of maritime security. All too often 
they are seconded by legal experts who claim that maritime security 
operations, while certainly necessary are contrary to international law. 
Thus, the law is being abused as a cheap excuse for passivity while, in 
reality, it is a lack of political will and courage that prevents the necessary 
steps from being taken.” 97 
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 Industry players believed that passive approaches were best in the fight 
against piracy as they do not aggravate an already escalated situation98. For 
example, it was mentioned that if seafarers attempted to defend themselves and 
fail, this could lead to them feeling the “wrath” of the pirates. In the researcher’s 
point of view, the passive methods could also elicit this wrath and can be equally 
dangerous. Seafarers using the cannons or hoses to spray water in an attempt to 
deter pirates from coming abroad are opened to being injured by pirates while 
employing this technique. It is believed that pirates would become agitated by any 
means of deterrents and will react accordingly. The case of M/V Theresa is a 
classic example, where a North Korean Captain was fatally shot after firing a flare 
gun in wake of an impending pirate attack.99  In other cases, victims have 
cooperated fully and still were taken hostages; as in the case of the owners of the 
Lynne Rival.100   
 As seen in the previous cases, the sanctuary of citadels has failed in the 
past and seafarers have been beaten and taken hostage. It is also noted that it is 
becoming a trend for pirates to set fire to ships when they cannot locate the 
crew.101 It is believed that this method also poses a great danger to seafarers who 
are locked away in a dark, stifling narrow citadel. In addition, it was mentioned 
that some vessels carry combustible products making the fear of arming even 
higher in wake of possible fireballs in a gun battle. Again if pirates set fire to the 
vessel, the effect will be just the same. 
                                                          
98
 Monje, S. C. (2011). Citadels: Passive Defence Against Pirate Attacks.Australian Journal of 
Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 3(2), 43., accessed 8 April 2013 from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/893179132/13D562C229C44801EE0/8?accountid=43722  
99 Martin, J. S. (2009). Fighting Piracy with Private Security Measures: When Contract Law 
Should Tell Parties to Walk the Plank. Am. UL Rev., 59, 1363. accessed on 17 September, 2013 
from 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/aulr59&div=39&g_sent=1&collection=jour
nals 
100
 Ibid at pp. 1370 
101
 Monje, S. C. (2011). Citadels: Passive Defence Against Pirate Attacks.Australian Journal of 
Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 3(2), 43., accessed 8 April 2013 from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/893179132/13D562C229C44801EE0/8?accountid=43722 
47 
 
 It is believed that active defence should be left to the militaries but as 
aforementioned, the ratio of warship to merchant ships is not equal. Once again 
these vessels will be left susceptible to piratical hijackings. All of the aforesaid 
may be reasons justifying the arming of seafarers. 
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CHAPTER III 
ARMING OF SEAFARERS 
3.1. Historical Overview of Arming of Merchant Ships in the Past 
 
It was common place for merchant ships to be armed in the 1700s.
102
 One 
reason for arming was for the protection of trade and commerce.
103
 In the 19
th
 
Century Britain was one such country that used arms on board their merchant 
ships for protecting its cargo. McCurdy wrote the following: 
 “The right of a merchant ship to defend itself against capture by the enemy in 
time of war was never doubted. The carrying of guns for defensive purposes was 
a common practice in the British merchant service during the Napoleonic wars. 
As late as 1855, the ships engaged in the opium trade were armed for the 
protection of their valuable cargo against pirates and others.”104 
The renewal of this policy on the part of British Admiralty was announced 
by Sir Winston Churchill on the 17
th
 of March 1914 in the House of Commons. 
Sir Churchill explained the grounds on which merchant ships could be armed:  
“They are armed solely for defensive purposes. The guns are mounted in the 
stern and can only fire on a pursuer. These vessels are not privateers or 
commerce destroyers in any sense. They are, however, thoroughly capable of 
self-defence against an enemy's armed merchantman. The fact of their being so 
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armed will probably prove an effective deterrent alone on the depredations of 
armed merchantmen and an effective protection for these ships and for the vital 
supplies that they carry.”105 
Though this practice started solely to protect Britain’s interest at the time, 
it was also explicitly stated that it aimed to protect against acts of piracy and 
others. Thus it is evidenced that arming merchant ships against acts of piracy was 
a method used in the past. Notwithstanding, the perceptions on arming merchant 
ships have almost always attracted the same response.  Subsequent to Britain’s 
admiralty, major shipping companies, though they refused to comment, readily 
expressed their patriotism to the United Kingdom by agreeing to this policy. 
Some ship owners and jurists from neutral states were not in favour of this 
proposition. It was their belief that the proposal was divergent to the Declaration 
of Paris
106
, as well as, the expanded burdens and operations such decision would 
have had on naval welfare. Evidence of such opposition came in form of letters 
from neutral countries such as Belgium, Holland, Norway and Sweden.
107
 
German Jurists denied the rights of merchant ships to bear arms on the 
basis of self-defence. Following a meeting at the Institute of International Law at 
Oxford in 1913, article 12 of the Manuel des Lois de la Guerre Maritime
108
 was 
adopted. Article 12 (translated by the writer. See original format in footnote 102) 
read:   
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“the race is prohibited....... public ships and private vessels, and their staff 
cannot deliver acts of hostility against the enemy. Permission is granted to each 
other to use force to defend themselves against the attack of an enemy ship.”109 
The position of arming vessels in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
traces back to present day and to the topic of this dissertation. It can be concluded 
that arming of merchant ships was a practice of the past. The pertinent questions 
would be why this practice was ceased and whether it is time to revert to the once 
practiced method.  
 
The Disarming of Merchant Ships 
  
Based on the foregoing, it was mentioned that Britain’s reason for arming 
their merchant ships was for protecting trade against attacks from other merchant 
ships and against pirates. Britain maintained that their vessels were not equipped 
with armament to partake in any acts of war. As such neutral countries like the 
United States, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Sweden admitted armed British 
merchant ships in their ports. In 1914 however, Mr. Winston Churchill further 
informed that in addition to the existing 1000 armed merchant ships, they would 
be adding 2000 more armed vessels, some of which were equipped with guns 
used by naval crews. This revelation surfaced questions of whether the ships’ 
arms would be viewed as defensive arming or offensive arming and whether they 
would be mistaken for belligerent ships and as be attacked and sunken by 
submarines. On January 18, 1916, Mr. Lansing of the United States wrote to the 
British Government proposing the disarming of U.K’s merchant ships. The 
                                                          
109
 Ibid at pp. 49-50, see also Manuel des Lois de La Guerre Maritime, Oxford, 9 août 1913 
accessed 12 September, 2013 from http://olivier.hammam.free.fr/imports/conv-guerre/1913.htm 
 
51 
 
communique proposed that since pirates and privateers were no longer traversing 
the main commerce channels there were no longer need for arming. In the 1950s 
British merchant ships were duly disarmed.
110
  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The disarming of merchant ships was attributed to the decline in 
privateering and piratical activities. Seen as the crime of piracy among others 
have resurface perhaps it is time to revert to the old practice of arming merchant 
ships and sailors once more. 
 
 
3.2. Determining Who Should Be Armed  
Determining Who Should be Armed Based on the MLC 
 
 It is of paramount importance that it is established who should be armed. 
Seen as there is strong resistance against the direct arming of seafarers, it needs to 
be ascertained whether the armed security forces are considered as seafarers. The 
definition of a seafarer as so stated under article 2 subparagraph 1(f) of the 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006, defines a seafarer as “all persons who are 
employed or are engaged or work in any capacity on board a ship to which the 
Convention applies”.111  The new definition of a seafarer under the MLC was 
extended to include persons who worked on board ship for example hairdressers 
and doctors. However, article 2 paragraph 3 of the MLC states that in the event of 
doubt in determining who is a seafarer, the competent authority in each Member 
state, after consulting with the ship owners’ and seafarers’ organization can make 
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a decision to deem a person as a seafarer.
112
 It should be noted that a government 
by itself cannot decide who is deemed a seafarer.  
 
Determining Who Should be Armed Based on ILO Resolution No. 185 
 
The ILO Resolution No. 185 adopted at its 94
th
 Maritime session on 
February 22, 2006, in Geneva states that “there are persons who principally work 
onshore, but occasionally spend a short period on working on a ship. These may 
not be seafarers; there are persons who regularly spend a short time period on a 
ship. These may be seafarers.
113
 The 2006 ILO Resolution provides these criteria 
to resolve the doubts when deciding who should be considered as a seafarer: 
 The duration of the stay on board of the persons concerned 
 The frequency of periods of work spent on board 
 The location of the person’s principal place of work 
 The purpose of the person’s work on board 
 The protection that would normally be available to the persons 
concerned with regard to their labour and social conditions to 
ensure they are comparable to that provided for under the 
Convention
114
 
The MLC 2006 definition seemingly creates a grey area as to whether or 
not armed security forces personnel can be considered as seafarers. Liz 
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McMahon’s article, published on Lloyd’s on May, 2013, voiced concerns with the 
MLC 2006 definition of a seafarer: 
“Ship owners and private maritime security companies have voiced concern over 
moves by the Maritime Labour Convention to class armed guards as seafarers, 
questioning how this will work in practice. When the MLC comes into force in 
August, security personnel deployed on ships could be classed as seafarers if they 
meet the definition outlined in Article II.1 of the convention. 
If the matter is unclear, it may be left to the individual flag administration to 
decide whether it considers the guards to be seafarers. Industry watchers have 
urged flag administrations making that call to consider factors such as duration of 
the guards’ stay on board, frequency of work on board, the location of his or her 
principal place of work, the purpose of that work and protection cover for labour 
and social conditions though a final decision has not been made on whether 
armed guards would be classified as seafarers, early indicators suggest that this 
will be the case.”115 
If armed security guards are indeed considered as seafarers based on the 
definition given by the MLC 2006, then armed seafarers would have already been 
on board ships. Hence, the other distinction that must be made for the purposes of 
this paper is who to arm; whether be it a military seafarer, privately armed 
security guards or civilian seafarers. The following sentences define a seafarer in 
the author’s view. 
Oxford online dictionary defines “military” as “armed forces of a 
country”116  Therefore, the writer’s definition of a military seafarer, is a seafarer 
who has undergone military training and who has been placed on board ships by 
their States for protecting civilian seafarers and ensure the safety of the vessel.   
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Privately armed security guards are persons who have undergone artillery training 
and are so certified to carry and use arms if necessary. It should be noted that 
private security guards can also be unarmed. These persons are normally joined to 
a security company and provides on board security services similar to the services 
of shore-based security guards.  
Civilian as defined by Oxford online dictionary is a person who is not a 
part of the armed forces or police force.
117
  Therefore civilian seafarers are those 
individuals who have complied with the STWC requirements and have been 
deemed and certified as able bodied seamen and officers. In this research, the 
writer intends to evaluate the arming of civilian seafarers. It is important to justify 
hereafter, whether these civilian seafarers have a right to bear arms to protect 
themselves.  
 
Difference between Military, Private Armed Security Guards 
The distinguishing difference between military personnel and privately 
armed security personnel is that militaries are commissioned by the flag states. A 
military personnel providing security assurance on board takes orders from the 
states and not from the captain as per regulation 34.1 of SOLAS. Seen as the 
Captain does not have overall responsibility of security and does not give 
directions to the military personnel, he is exempted from liabilities. For example, 
as in the case of Enrica Lexie where the navy was providing security for the 
vessel, this meant that the navies acted under the directions of the state, thus the 
Captain of the ship was not held liability along with the navy personnel.  
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Privately armed security personnel have a contractual relationship with the 
ship owner for a specified period of time. During this period of time on board, the 
Master has the overall responsibility as per article 34.1 of SOLAS. For example 
given that the security personnel has fatally injured a pirate, then the Master may 
also be subjected to legal implications. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
From the above definitions, it is clarified that the writer intends to explore the 
possibility of arming civilian seafarers. 
 
3.3. Rationale for Arming of Civilian Seafarers 
Fundamental Rights to Safety 
The Magna Carta was developed in the 13
th
 century and represented the 
first fundamental human rights instrument. The 1689 English Bill of Rights, the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789, followed by the French 
Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, were among 
other examples of early human rights tools.
118
/
119
  On December 10, 1948, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted and declared the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
120
 The UN Declaration of Human Rights 
speaks to the equality, respect, peace, freedom and justice of all members of the 
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human family. Article 3 in particular states that everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and the security of person.
121
  
As a part of the human race, a seafarer has the right to life; freedom from 
torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment; freedom from coerced labour; 
freedom from discrimination, and a right to legal remedy and access to justice. As 
an employee, the seafarers under article IV of the MLC, has a right to a safe and 
healthy working conditions among other things. 
122
  In the preparatory texts, it has 
been evidenced that the existing methods intended for the suppression of piracy, 
armed robbery and maritime terrorism have drawbacks which prevents their 
effectiveness. Thus seen as the seafarer is entitled to this right of safety and at 
present this is not being done, perhaps the seafarers should be allowed to protect 
themselves. Currently there are no applicable laws that forbade arming of 
seafarers. In fact, merchant ships are vindicated to protect themselves at sea 
against an illegal impending attack within the limits of necessity and 
proportionality. Protection of a seafarer’s fundamental rights may be one 
justifiable reason to arm the crew.123 
 
Fulfilling the Basic Need for Security 
 Often time seafarers feel defenceless in the face of imminent danger. This 
could have negative implications on the seafarer. For example, a seafarer knowing 
that the next planned route will see the vessel traversing some of the high risk 
areas such as the Horn of Africa, may become anxious of the possible threats to 
his wellbeing. This may in turn affect the productivity of the seafarer. In April 
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2009, an American Captain, Richard Phillips was rescued from Somali pirates. 
During the rescue operation three (3) Somali pirates were killed. This led to 
threats of vengeance on the next American seafarer captured. This situation 
resurrected the long standing debates on whether a crew member should be armed. 
Barker Parker, a shipping consultant in New York and former ship broker, 
envisaged that internal agreements would be drafted to permit captains to keep 
firearms and distribute them in times of potential danger from pirates.124  Captain 
Phillips, albeit his acknowledgment that using arms on board is a sensitive issue, 
supports that senior members of the crew should have access to weapons that can 
be used in dire straits. This statement could have been fuelled by his previous 
misfortune or it could be the need to feel secured.
125
 
Extended Hostage Situations 
 In January 2011, the M/V Leopard was hijacked by pirates who took the 
crew consisting of two Danes and four Filipinos. Twenty eight months after the 
crew was still being held captive. In 2010, the M/V Albedo was hijacked and the 
crew held for over one year; in 2011 an article was released giving hope that the 
hostages would have soon seen freedom
126
, however, after two (2) years and nine 
(9) months, the seafarers are still left at the mercies of their hijackers
127
.  The ship 
sunk in July, 2013 subsequent to which four (4) persons of the fifteen (15) crew 
members went missing. The latest reports on this incident informed that the 
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Iranian owner has fled. Seven Pakistani sailors were rescued as a result of a 
generous endowment from their fellow countrymen; the remaining crew members 
from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Iran and India have had no such benefactor. At 
present, the European Union naval forces have been patrolling the waters 
neighbouring the M/V Albedo’s sunken hull.128  Though their presence has 
deterred pirate attacks, their mandate does not extend to rescue operations. The 
question is what will become of these remaining seafarers? Who will now step in 
and ensure their safe return home? The foregoing situation is a tell-tale sign that 
duties and responsibilities are not always fulfilled. As mentioned in chapter 2, the 
flag state is responsible to ensure that seafarers remain safe. In the above case, 
these sailors are subject to whatever ill-fated future their captors have in mind for 
them. If protection is not being given as ought to, then perhaps this justifies yet 
another reason why sailors should be given the opportunity to protect themselves. 
Inhumane Treatment 
 A bitter association with being held hostage is the inhumane treatment that 
sometimes occurred. Ocean Beyond Piracy reported that in 2011, 1206 seafarers 
taken hostage were mistreated and in some instances extremely abused.
129
  The 
report revealed that 35 seafarers died after being held hostages; while 8 were 
killed by pirates after being taken captive, a further 8 died from disease and 
malnourishment  while being held captive; and 19 died while being used as 
human shields during hostage rescue efforts
130
 (see Chapter 2, Human Costs of 
Piracy). A tale of a seafarer, Rathore read: 
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“They kept us in a state of terror – we were beaten constantly with metal poles. I 
managed to avoid the worst violence, but I saw my crewmates being thrashed 
with sticks and having electric probes attached to their genitals, and one man was 
suspended by ropes from the ship’s mast for several hours. Even when I could 
not see the torturing, I could hear the screams. I can still hear the screams to this 
day.”131 
 It is believed that if seafarers attempt to defend themselves and fail, this 
could lead to them feeling the “wrath” of the pirates. 132 At present it would seem 
as though the sailors are feeling the wrath of pirates in any given situation.  To add 
to an already horrendous situation, seafarers in some instances are further 
victimized by the very companies they work for. Liz McMahon wrote about the 
incongruences between survivors of piratical attacks and the treatment received 
from employers. The report reveals that seafarers are often refused reimbursement 
for personal belongings lost during hijackings, loss of pay and coerced 
resignations as such 31% of sailors who have been captured does not plan to 
return to sea ( see figure 10).
133
 
Limited Protection under Flags of Conveniences  
 Another notable detractor is aligned with the use of flag of conveniences or 
open registries. Flags of conveniences are used because of their attractive 
incentive packages such as tax breaks; however, in many cases these registries 
lack the ability and resources to effectively protect the crew under their flags. It 
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should be noted that it is the flag state’s responsibility to protect the crew under 
its flags. 
134
 
Figure 10. Financial Hardships Experienced by Seafarers After a Piracy Incident 
  
For example Antigua and Barbuda does not have the required resources to protect 
the ships bearing its flag. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 There are a plethora of shortcomings in the minefield of maritime security 
leads the author back to its position of why the protection of those at risk maybe 
better left up to the seafarer themselves. One maxim said “when the flag states 
and coastal states have failed in their mandate to protect against acts of on sea 
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violence, then the last resort is self-defence by merchant ships”135. Direct arming 
of the crews would provide reliable and timely defence mechanisms; reduce the 
associated cost of anti-piracy strategies and most of all give seafarers more 
secured feeling.  As seen earlier in the case of MV Magellan Star, the ship was 
being escorted by a naval vessel, prior to losing contact at sea. This made the 
vessel vulnerable to the impending hijacking. This evidenced that direct arming of 
the crew would be more readily reliable than expected naval enforcement support.  
Moreover as mentioned before, 50,000 vessels traverse the Malacca Straits 
annually carrying an estimated one third of the world’s trade;136 additionally 
20,000-30,000 ships ply through the Gulf of Aden yearly; it becomes almost 
impossible to provide the corresponding number of warships needed to escort 
these vessels through these high-risked areas.
137
  Thus, the ratio of warship to 
merchant ships is disparate. Furthermore, it is quite costly to use naval forces as 
escorts with military protection equalling approximately 2.9 million per day (see 
breakdown in figure 8 and 9). It is anticipated that soon many states will not be 
able to render this assistance. Given the high associated costs and the limited 
numbers of vessels, it is only natural that despite international agreements, 
countries may only be able to protect their commercial vessels.
138
  
Being without protection leaves seafarers susceptible to pirate attacks and 
fosters the vulnerability leaving them open to hijackings and the possibility of 
                                                          
135
 Haywood, R. and Spivak, R (2012) Maritime Piracy. New York, N. Y; Routledge pg 153 
136
 Kraska, J., & Wilson, B. (2009). Somali piracy: a nasty problem, a web of responses. Current 
History, 108(718), 227-231.  accessed on 8 April 2013     from    
http://search.proquest.com/docview/200722244/13D5678A36B6BE8700E/11?accountid=43722 
137
 Monje, S. C. (2011). Citadels: Passive Defence Against Pirate Attacks.Australian Journal of 
Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 3(2), 43., accessed 8 April 2013 from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/893179132/13D562C229C44801EE0/8?accountid=43722,  
138
 ibid 
62 
 
being taken hostages.  As seen in the above text, 31% of seafarers have decided 
not to return to the sea. Perhaps these are valid reasons for allowing civilian 
seafarers to try protecting themselves or perhaps these are deterrents to the 
profession at seafaring.  
 
3.4. Flag States that are Employing Armed Guards/Non-Military 
Personnel/Military/Armed Civilian Seafarers 
 This section will look at flags states that allow arming vessels. UNCLOS 
is the regulatory body for all activities on the high sea. However article 94(1) of 
UNCLOS states that each flag must exercise jurisdiction over the ships that fly its 
flag. 
139
  Therefore, the guidelines governing the carriage of artilleries are that of 
the flag state; however, upon reaching the coastal waters of another state, the 
jurisdiction of that state will so apply. On this basis, a state may forbid the 
entrance of arms of any kind, even though it is allowed under the flag state.
140
   
Some countries should as France and Spain require a licence for arms. A 
declaration of security as per the tenets of ISPS 5.1 is needed to state that the ship 
is carrying guns in several countries such as Kenya and Brazil to name a few. The 
United Kingdom has provided specific guidelines for the use of armed guards on 
board Britain flagged ships. Similarly, island states such as St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines has permitted the use of armed guards on board their ships. Australia 
along with South African countries require that all firearms must be registered, 
which in reality means that overseas vessels cannot bring weapons into the 
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country. In 2011 two masters were arrested and charged for breaching the South 
African Firearm Control Act.141   
Following the Maersk Alabama incident, the United States issued an 
advisory informing that vessels flagged under their state, may use deadly force to 
defend themselves in the eye of impending danger. However, this recourse should 
be action under the direction of the master. The advisory further states that 
seafarers are not legally required to retreat, or use warning shots prior to using 
deadly force.142  
Concluding Remarks 
It should be noted that the above mentioned countries have taken the 
initiative to arm its crew through the use of military protection or privately armed 
security guards.  However, the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code necessitates that all vessels that have been flagged in a state that is 
party to SOLAS 1974 must  put in place a safety plan specific to each vessel. 
These procedures are not rigid, thus the carriage and or use of firearms for self-
defence is not forbidden.
143
  In that said vein, Israel is one country that is believed 
to have taken the initiative to directly arm its crew.
144
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3.5. Legal Justification of Arming Civilian Seafarers 
Despite the existing international laws such as UNCLOS, SUA, SOLAS, 
ISPS and the numerous IMO Resolutions addressing maritime security, the 
unlawful acts still thrives because of the inadequacies within the legal systems.
145
 
The international legal system of interference rights and counter measures is still 
riddled with gaps and thus is part of the problem.
146
  At present, there are no 
specific laws relating to armed seafarers, thus the aim of this section is to provide 
the legal implications of having armed seafarers on board and to ascertain whether 
under the existing laws arming of seafarers is justifiable.  
 
The Arming Seafarers and International Instruments 
UNCLOS 
As mentioned earlier, maritime piracy is one of the major threats to 
maritime security and the most prevailing crimes in the present time. The crime of 
piracy is dealt with by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) particularly articles 100 to 107 and 110. However there are some 
provisions that can be interpreted and hence forth apply and justify the arming of 
seafarers while others cannot. One such provision which cannot justify the 
position of arming is article 105 of UNCLOS. Article 105 of UNCLOS provides 
that a State may seize a pirate ship, or a ship taken by piracy under the control of 
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. As it can be 
deduced from the aforesaid provision, the power to seize ships in the event of 
piracy belongs only to the State and not to civilians. Therefore, the said provision 
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cannot be used as a basis for arming seafarers or deploying armed security. Thus 
this provision though, it governs piracy, will not be examined.  
 
Reservation of peaceful purposes on the high seas under UNCLOS 
 
Although article 105 cannot be used to justify the arming of seafarers, 
reference can be made to articles 88 of UNCLOS in relation to articles 98 and 
100
147
 thereof.  
 
Article 88 of UNCLOS provides that the “high seas shall be reserved for 
peaceful purposes”, article 98 particularly paragraph 1(b) thereof requires the 
master of a ship to render assistance and rescue persons in distress and finally 
article 100 requires the cooperation of all State in the repression of piracy on the 
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
148
 
 
In order to reserve the high seas for peaceful purposes, article 100 of 
UNCLOS can be used to complement article 88 thereof. The State is required to 
cooperate under article 100 in order to repress piracy and this cooperation can be 
manifested when there is a noticeable effort to accomplish the purpose.  Thus, in 
order to accomplish article 88 and comply with article 100 of UNCLOS, a State 
may domestically legislate laws that will address piracy and other maritime 
related offences and provide for the preventive measures that can be used to 
combat piracy or maritime terrorism; these preventive measures may include the 
arming of seafarers.
149
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Moreover, article 98 allows the master of a ship to rescue persons in 
distress. The manner of how to rescue the person in distress was not specifically 
provided therein, therefore rescue may include employing the use of force if and 
when necessary. The possible implication is that, the use of force may entail 
criminal liability and sanctions. Considering the foregoing premises, articles 88, 
98 and 100 warrant the arming of seafarers, and this premise can be further 
buttressed by article 91 of UNCLOS.
150
 
 
 
Nationality of Ships under UNCLOS 
  
Article 91 of UNCLOS reads “every State shall fix the conditions for the 
grant of its nationality to ships….” The nationality of ships is governed by 
UNCLOS, and under article 91 thereof, the State is given the power to prescribe 
the grounds on which it will attach its nationality to a ship. Therefore a State may 
prescribe the terms and conditions for arming seafarers to its Flag State ships. 
Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that arming seafarers is not as easy as it may seem 
as the ship moves from place to place. For example a ship moves from the high 
seas to the territorial jurisdiction of another State, this may therefore result in 
complexities in the application of legal rules. It is so as, even if the State allows 
its Flag State ship to arm seafarers, in other jurisdictions where the ship operates, 
the carriage of firearms may be prohibited and therefore may become illegal. 
Furthermore the ship will be subjected to that State’s law and jurisdiction as it can 
only sail under the flag of one State as provided by Article 92 of UNCLOS which 
states that: 
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“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional 
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this 
Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high 
seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of 
call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of 
registry.” 
As earlier mentioned, in some jurisdiction the carriage of firearms is 
prohibited and therefore is considered illegal. In this regard, there could be a 
number of possible insurance liability issues to consider in which the ship owners 
must concern themselves with. Section 41 of the English Marine Insurance Act 
(MIA)
151
 of 1906 provides that every voyage is lawful and that voyage will be 
carried out in a lawful manner. This article refers to implied warranty. Thus, an 
implied warranty is breached when the carriage of firearms become unlawful, and 
when there is breach of implied warranty the insurer is therefore discharged from 
any insurance liability.  
 
SUA Convention and ISPS Code 
As can be observed from the above-mentioned discussion, UNCLOS,
152
 
particularly articles      100-107 and 110 only covers the crime of piracy. Thus 
subsequent to the Achille Lauro incident, there were no existing laws that covered 
the crime of hijacking, as such the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 
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Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 (SUA Convention)
153
 was enacted 
to cover all forms of maritime violence, which also includes the crime of piracy. 
 
While SUA defines other maritime crimes, however it can be gleaned therefrom that 
SUA is more focus on establishing jurisdiction on how to prosecute perpetrators.  Nevertheless, 
article 13 paragraph 1(a) states that:  
“States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offenses as set forth in articles 3 
by taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the 
commission of those offenses within or outside their jurisdiction.” 
Article 13 paragraph 1 (a) of SUA Convention must be read in relation to 
the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as the former 
Convention provides that a State Party shall take all practicable measures to 
prevent the commission of maritime offenses. The ISPS Code provides for the 
number of preventive measures to combat maritime offenses. The ISPS Code is a 
consolidated guidance on the implementation of the security-related amendments 
to the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 SOLAS 
Convention.
154
 
 
The ISPS Code prescribes a “special measures to be used to enhance 
maritime security” which is referred to as Maritime Security Measures (MSM).155 
Accordingly, MSM was developed in response to perceived terrorist threats, and 
are also applicable to countering other forms of security threats, notably piracy 
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and armed robbery in international and territorial waters.
156
 Thus, the principal 
purpose of the ISPS Code can be considered to reduce the vulnerability of the 
maritime industry to security threats, regardless of their measures
157
. 
 
Section 9.1 Part A provides that “each ship shall carry on board a Ship 
Security Plan (SSP) approved by the Administration. The plan shall make 
provision for the three security levels as defined in the said Code. SSP as defined 
in Paragraph 4, Section 2.1, Part A of ISPS Code is a plan developed to ensure the 
application of measures on board the ship designed to protect persons on board, 
cargo transport units and ship’s stores or the ship from the risks of a security 
incident. 
 
As it can be inferred therefrom, the ship company may use various kinds 
of security measures, including the carriage of firearms as the enumerations given 
under Section 9 and sub-sections 9.1 to 9.8 are neither exclusive nor prescriptive.  
Furthermore, under ISPS Code, a State may enact full implementation of the 
MSM and may provide for regulations on the carriage of firearms on-board as a 
form of security measure. Thus, SUA Convention and ISPS Code empower the 
State to provide preventive measures, thus, the arming seafarers can be considered 
as preventive measure and may likewise be considered as anticipatory self-
defence. 
 
Another security measure that the State may prescribe is with regard to the 
training of seafarers. Section 2.9.8 of ISPS Code provides that “the STCW Code 
recognizes that shipboard personnel are not security experts, thus they should 
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receive adequate training so as to acquire the required competencies to perform 
their assigned duties and collectively contribute to the enhancement of maritime 
security.” Accordingly, STCW Convention and STCW Code establish a 
mandatory minimum requirement for security-related training and instruction for 
all SSOs and shipboard personnel serving on SOLAS ships.
158
 Thus the same 
training may likewise be provided with seafarers who intend to be armed and hold 
security duties.  Further, the State may legislate additional training to make the 
seafarers competent to use and carry firearms. 
 
IMO Resolutions 
The Private Security Contractors (PSCs) like armed seafarers are civilians 
in nature. The frequent attacks of Somali pirates led many private shipping 
companies to hire PSCs. At present it can be said that PSCs is internationally 
accepted as a matter of practice, however the armed seafarers are yet to be 
recognized by the international law. In most countries, however, weapons are 
banned; they are confiscated or secured in a holding area before a ship can enter a 
port.  
The IMO recognizing that the existence of PSCs and the need to regulate 
the same has issued MSC.1 Circ. 1405 on 25 May 2012. The said Resolution 
provides for a revised interim guidance to ship owners, ship operators and 
shipmaster on the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) 
on board ships in the high risk area. According to Paragraph 1.3, the purpose of 
the said guidance is to assist ship owners, ship operators and shipmasters on the 
use of PCASP in order to provide protection against piracy. Further the IMO, 
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under paragraph 1.1 of the said Circular recognized the increasing threat to 
commercial shipping by Somalia-based pirates and the difficulty to identify 
reliable professional private providers of armed security, hence the issuance of the 
subject Circular.  
 
As can be inferred therefrom, IMO has recognized the need for the 
deployment of PCASP as this is one of the effective measures being employed by 
most shipping companies to combat piracy. As deployment of PCS is considered 
as one of the preventive measures to combat maritime offenses, thus in the same 
vein, arming of seafarers can likewise be considered as preventive measure, hence 
the author is of the view that IMO may in the future enact resolutions that will 
regulate the arming of seafarers as some countries like Israel is starting to arm 
their seafarers. 
 
Resolution 2020 and 2015 provides for a twelve (12) month extension of 
authorization given under Resolution 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008) to States and 
regional organizations cooperating with the Somali Transitional Federal 
Government to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “ all necessary means” 
to fight piracy. Necessary means may include the use of force, and use of force 
may include the use of firearms, and when it includes the use of firearms 
consequently it can arm seafarers. However reading from the wording of the said 
Resolutions, it can be inferred therefrom that these Resolutions are only 
applicable to Somali pirates and not to other pirates. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Though the laws are not specific to seafarers, the natures of the provisions 
governing maritime security are open for interpretations. In justifying the position 
to arm, the writer has sought to find the loopholes through which arming of 
civilian seafarers could be permitted. Hence based on the forgoing, it can be 
concluded that arming of seafarers is justifiable under the international 
instruments. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONSEQUENCES OF ARMING SEAFARERS 
 
 Training Requirements under STCW/ISPS 
The ability to fully evaluate a situation before reacting may come with 
some level of training. This would be important if one should consider the arming 
of civilian seafarers. How much training would these persons need to safely 
operate, what level of training would be needed; how often would the need to re-
train or obtain re-certification to use a gun be, what are the associated cost of 
training and who would undertake the bills for training. Even so what amount of 
training would be needed to equip civilian seafarers with the necessary skills to 
coherently appraise a situation before acting; bearing in mind that some actions 
could lead to law suits against the company and possible criminal charges for the 
seafarer. The 2008, International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) Manila amendments 
incorporated new requirements for security training with the primary purpose of 
integrating Ship Security Officer (SSO) on board. This training is as a result of 
the ISPS Code implementation, which aims to dissuade and thwart threats and to 
mitigate the effects of security incidents.
159
 Notwithstanding, these security tasks 
and training are surety to the primary functions of a seafarer as a navigator or 
engineers. Hence, it is believed that the training does not provide the aptitude 
similar to that of security professionals who are so trained to detect, divert, 
suspend and counteract targets.
160
 Not to be confused as this basis was also used 
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as a justifiable means of arming, however, given that the STCW, did not explicitly 
provide guidelines on the qualifications and training for armed seafarers, but 
seafarers in general, this could also be translated to mean that seafarers though 
being trained as Ship Security Officers (SSO) are not being trained in combat or 
weapons training
161
 similarly it could be interpreted otherwise. 
One other disadvantage of being untrained for combat is that expertise 
maybe lacking to efficiently and successfully be engaged in gun exchange. 
Stakeholders worry that the crew could be killed instead of held for ransom if they 
have engaged in unsuccessful battles with pirates.
162
  In addition, specifically with 
regard to Somalia, there is a widespread concern that the use of force will lead to 
an escalation of violence in a region where pirates have, for the most part, avoided 
inflicting injury on their victims. Additionally there are fears that arming of 
seafarers who are also inadequately trained may cause injury to members of the 
crew, as well as, themselves.
163
 
Liability and Criminal Sanctions 
Criminal liabilities may arise out of what may be perceived as justifiable 
actions as in the case of the Enrica Lexie, where two Italian Marines have been 
charged with murder after acting against what they perceived as a potential 
threat
164
. In 2012, two Italian marines who were apart of the Italian anti-piracy 
coalition allegedly killed two Indian fishermen mistaking them for pirates.  There 
have been other incidents in which there were no impending prosecutions such as 
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the Suez Canal shooting in 2008, where three boats were approaching a cargo 
vessel, the Global Patriot; following three warning shots two of the three vessels 
retreated except one which coincidentally had a cigarette vendor on board. The 
security team mistaking the vendor for a potential threat shot and killed the 28 
year old Egyptian seller.
165
  
 
Prohibited From Entering Ports  
 Weaponries pose legal complications as they are forbidden on some 
merchant ships, as well as, in some ports around the world. In 2010, the Suez 
Canal became one such entity that forbade this practice.166  As mentioned earlier 
in the preceding texts, because the ship is a floating device and navigates 
numerous ports around the world, upon reaching ports that under their jurisdiction 
carriage of firearm is prohibited, the ship will not be granted access unless under 
5.1 of the ISPS code a Declaration of Security (DOS) was prior sent 
communicating that the ship is so armed. 
 
Attracting Criminal Intent and Elements 
 As a matter of safety, it is questioned whether ships carrying weapons may 
attract potential criminals aiming to stealing these artilleries.
167
  In the same vein 
it could also harbour thoughts of criminal intents, such as in the case of M/V Myre 
Seadiver where 15 Russian seafarers were detained and charged in Nigeria with 
                                                          
165
 ibid 
166
 Marmon W. (2011, November). Merchant ships starting to carry armed guards against Somali 
pirates. The European Institute. Retrieved on 9 April, 2013, from http://www.europeaninstitue.org 
167
 Bradsher K. (2009, April 13). Captain's Rescue Revives Debate Over Arming Crews. The New 
York Times. Retrieved on 8 April 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com 
76 
 
illegal importation of arms, ammunition and for not declaring the contents of the 
ship. A bail bond of $500,000.00 was also placed on the vessel.
168
  Why would 
this be? If permission is given to place arms on board merchant ships for 
protection of the ship, it makes the ship vulnerable to illegal activities; some 
seafarers may get the idea of smuggling illegal guns and ammunition amongst the 
legitimate lot. This could lead to the practice of gun trafficking as well. 
 
The Ability of Seafarers to Bear Arms 
 Finally, aside from the criminal and civil liability that self-defence attracts, 
one pertinent question would be, are civilian seafarers capable of killing 
someone? If given the force to protect themselves, would they be ready to fight 
for their lives and be able to live with the aftermath? Martin
169
 relays the story 
where a crew member was evidently disturbed by actions of the military coalition 
securing their ship. In the same experience Martin explained that the cook on the 
other hand appeared to be untroubled by the events. While this experience is not 
one in the same as the crew actually inflicting the injuries, the results of the ability 
to cope with such experiences are the similar. 
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Rest Hours and Manning Levels are Limited  
Regulation 2.3 of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006
170
 speaks about 
the hours of rest and work periods that must be respected. In that regards it is 
noted that seafarers are already too busy with their schedules to effectively 
undertake the responsibility of protecting themselves and the ship through the use 
of arms. Therefore the consequences of arming would add additional stress to 
their already busy lives. Mejia wrote: 
“prevailing manning levels and the demanding nature of shipboard life are 
also factors that limit the options available to ship crews in dealing with security 
threats. Crews have simply become too small and too busy to offer any sort of 
realistic protection against a human intelligence actively seeking to subvert the 
ship to its wicked purpose”171 
 
Concluding Remarks 
From the aforesaid texts, it can be deduced that though arming of the crew 
may be justified in wake of the current situation surrounding these noble artisans. 
The above text has provided some instances in which arming of seafarers may 
have direct consequences such as being held criminally liable for injuries inflicted 
or the killing of persons at sea (be it pirates or fishermen or other users of the sea) 
. Additionally carrying arms proves to impede security measures as such ships 
may not be admitted in ports.  Furthermore, seafarers are already too busy to be 
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burdened with the responsibility of bearing arms to protect themselves and their 
ships. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Concluding Remarks on Piracy and the Responses to Suppress the Crime 
The international laws governing maritime security have noticeable pitfalls 
which impede their ability to combat illegal acts at sea including maritime 
terrorism, armed robbery and piracy. Earlier in this dissertation, the evolution of 
piracy was examined for the purposes of illustrating that the archaic definition of 
piracy could no longer matched the contemporary practice of pirates today. 
UNCLOS definition of piracy under article 101 does not provide the legal basis 
for crimes that have taken place as close as 11.55 NM from shore. It should be 
reiterated that in order for piracy to be considered under the international regime, 
it must be conducted on the high seas. Furthermore, pirates are captured but not 
prosecuted and thereafter release. For example because of the loopholes embedded 
within the treaties, prosecutors may have a difficult task to indict pirates. 
Additionally the issue of gathering evidence for prosecution proves to be a long 
task and pirates just as any other human being has the right to fair treatment and 
judicial process. Hence they cannot be detained for a long period of time without 
being charged.  These loopholes also help to foster the crime of piracy. As seen 
earlier in the paper, the earnings generated from piratical activities compensate 
67-157 times more than the best earning option in Somalia. This firstly provides 
the encouragement for partaking in the crime and secondly seen as in most cases 
pirates are not prosecuted, this also offers an incentive to continue with the crime. 
Moreover if this trend is continued, under the existing suppression methods, this 
may never deter perspective pirates. 
 As a result, the crime is amplifying in different regions. As seen earlier in 
this dissertation, the crime was believed to have started with the Greeks and has 
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over decades spread to the once docile West Africa and at present it has 
manifested in the Horn of Africa. 
  The maritime community believes that the passive approaches are best in 
the fight against piracy as they do not aggravate an already escalated situation. 
The Best Management Practices are believed to be the safer options for securing 
the crew and ensuring safety to vessels traversing the high risk areas. Some 
persons are of the impression that the BMP is merely a communication campaign, 
others believe that it is an inexpensive method of providing security without 
taking into consideration the effectiveness of said security methods. In 
furtherance, it is believed that active defence should be left up to the naval forces, 
but as repeatedly mentioned, there are not enough warships to match the number 
of merchant ships traversing the trade channels. 
 
Concluding Remarks on Arming of Seafarers 
In iteration, there are no legally binding laws preventing the direct arming 
of seafarers.  As was mentioned, it is not unlawful to carry firearms, as the right to 
arm a vessel is vested in the flag states. Seen as the ship is governed under the 
jurisdiction of the flag state, it has the power to determine whether its vessel 
should be armed on the high seas. The problem arises because the ship is a 
floating device. Hence as it moves from different ports across the globe, it enters 
into the jurisdiction of different countries which may prohibit the carriage of 
firearms on board. 
Admittedly arming of the crew may present a more pragmatic solution due 
to the inability of the current relevant treaties and other practical solutions being 
used to repel the acts of piracy and other illegal acts at sea.  With reference to the 
preceding texts, the inhumane treatment of seafarers signifies a desperate call for 
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more consistently active measures to be employed in combating piracy and other 
on-sea violence. 
Notwithstanding the facts, the writer believes that the protection of any 
civilian ought to be left up to the relevant competent authorities. Hence seafarers 
should not be armed. For the reason that there are no clear guidelines determining 
how a civilian seafarer will be treated given that in the course of protecting his or 
herself have in the process injured or fatally wounded a pirate. If this action 
should be justified, it may be on the premise of self defence. Even so self defence 
is a complicated issue for the mere fact that what may constitute self defence in a 
particular country may differ in another state. Hence seafarers may be subjected 
to criminal implications. For example in the Enrica Lexie case, the two Italian 
militaries, though they acted out of perceived defence of the ship, they were 
subjected to criminal charges under the Indian Law.
172
  Though the afore 
mentioned case included navies, the essence remains the same, the laws 
governing another country is different from those of the flag states. Therefore if a 
civilian seafarer or armed security forces or naval force killed or injured a person 
then the criminal laws of that country may apply and the civilian seafarers could 
be faced with murder charges under the penal system of foreign laws.
173
  Palmer 
wrote: 
“The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in its M/V Saiga No 2 
judgment, which related to naval personnel, said that ‘international law … 
requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force 
is inevitable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the 
circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as 
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they do in other areas of international law.’ The judgment further suggests that 
practices which are normally followed before resorting to force must be used. 
These include both visual and auditory signals such as firing shots across the 
bows, and a variety of other measures.”174 
Consequently ships’ Captains may not approve of arms on the ship they 
are masters of as criminal and civil consequences extend to not only the 
perpetrator but the Captains and ship owners as well. This is so as under SOLAS 
34.1, the Captain has the overall responsibility, hence equally he would be held 
responsible for any criminal liability. 
Furthermore, the author has had the privilege to discuss this issue at length 
with seafarers at various levels in their professional career ranging from a current 
serving ship’s captain, second and third officers, cadets, navigation and 
engineering officer, industry players from prominent companies, and the 
conclusion at all levels and diaspora remained in line with that of the author’s. 
Civilian seafarers should not be armed. The common perception amongst these 
persons is that armed civilian seafarers are likely to turn on each other in times of 
conflicts and disagreements. Many went on to explain that a ship though a huge 
vessel, becomes quite a small space to share with people of diverse, cultures, 
backgrounds and practices. They believe that misunderstandings and rivalries are 
inevitable at some point, and that arms on board would be a foreseeable time 
bomb. Some persons were of the impression that select members of the team, 
mainly the Master could carry this weapon. It is the view that this would not be of 
much effectiveness in light of the heavy artilleries being carried by pirates. 
However, it is the writer’s believe that these sailors would have more to lose than 
to gain by being armed.  
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Recommendations 
It is recognized that amending the legal documents such as UNCLOS may not 
be a readily solution. Looking at the original adoption of the document, it took 12 
years for the instrument to be implemented. Hence to amend and accept a more 
contemporize version may take another 12 years. Hence the recommendations are 
as follows: 
 find ways of remedying the definition inefficiencies in UNCLOS and 
SUA Conventions. This may be done by means of a supplementary 
documents or chapters. In this way pirates can be duly prosecuted for the 
crimes they are committing on the world’s oceans. 
 Establish a national insurance fund for seafarers. This would also ensure 
that seafarers are not held hostages in hostile environments for longer than 
necessary. For example, by doing this seafarers would no longer have to 
wait on ship owners or operators to post their ransoms, as a scheme would 
readily be available for that purpose. The scheme would be reimbursed by 
the ship owners and or operators accordingly. 
In chapter one of the overview, it was mentioned that in order for a crime to 
be eradicated, the root cause must first be eliminated. If this is done, then the need 
for active measures such as arming of seafarers or use of militaries and private 
security guards may become null and void. Some companies have taken a step in 
this direction. Oceans Beyond Piracy reported that since early 2013, members of 
the shipping fraternity including K Line, Maersk Line, Stena, NYK Line, Mitsui 
OSK Line, Shell and BP have contributed $1 million dollars in support of job 
creation and capacity building projects in Somalia. The group has pledged a 
further $1.5 million to fund those same efforts. “175 
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Perhaps this is the first step in remedying the problems in Somalia and 
other trouble areas.  
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